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1 Introduction
In Malawi, maize is politics, and input subsidies
are central to this. Subsidy programmes, centred
on the supply of seed and fertiliser to support
maize production to boost national food security,
have created a strong actor network, involving
key government players, from the President
downwards, and including major donor aid
agencies, NGOs and others. This has created a
very particular political economy of seeds in
Malawi in recent years, and one that is highly
contested.
Notwithstanding the strong narratives about
national food security or public food aid, the
benefits of these interventions are unevenly
distributed, with most accruing to the elites in
both national and donor-led interventions.
International commercial seed sector players,
and their genetic material, have won out over
local producers and varieties, and local elites
have also profited.
The prominence of maize in the country’s
political economy is inevitable, due to frequent
episodes of chronic food insecurity since the turn
of the 1990s. This eventually saw the country
shift from being nationally self-sufficient in
maize in non-drought years to being dependent
on food aid and commercial imports (Devereux
2002; Chinsinga 2004). The capacity of the
country to feed itself was decimated, inter alia, by
regular bouts of flash floods and droughts,
removal of fertiliser and hybrid maize seed
subsidies and sharp devaluation of the local
currency that made farm inputs unaffordable to
the majority of the chronically impoverished
smallholder farmers.
The precarious food security situation prompted
several concerted responses from government with
support from donors. Since the late 1990s, the
three major initiatives have been: (1) the Starter
Pack (SP) programme (1998–2000); (2) the
Targeted Input Programme (TIP) (2001–2005);
and (3) the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme
(AISP) (2005 to date) (Levy 2005; Chinsinga 2007;
Dorward et al. 2007). The AISP in particular has
gained high profile coverage in the international
press and Malawi has become the darling of
‘Green Revolution’ advocates the world over.
The gains have certainly been impressive. For
four consecutive growing seasons between 2006
and 2010, Malawi consistently enjoyed
substantial maize surplus over and above its
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annual national requirement, estimated at 2.1
million metric tonnes. The New York Times
applauded Malawi for ‘ending famine [by] simply
ignoring experts’ (Dugger 2007); the UK
Guardian carried a piece on Malawi’s Green
Revolution, arguing ‘Africa’s Green Revolution
may be several steps nearer after a pioneering
experiment in seed and fertiliser subsidies to
smallholders in Malawi’ (Perkins 2009) and
AGRA (2009: 2) touted Malawi as ‘a model of
success showing the rest of the African
governments the way towards a sustainable
version of the African Green Revolution’.
This article provides a critical account of how the
cereal seed system has evolved as an integral
part of Malawi’s twenty-first century ‘maize
miracle’, exploring the underlying politics,
winners and losers, in Malawi’s ‘Green
Revolution’.
2 Privatisation and profits: the reconfiguration
of the Malawian seed system
The liberalised seed industry in Malawi is
dominated by multinational seed companies
which control about 90 per cent of the market
(GRAIN 2010). The multinational seed
companies include: Monsanto, Seed Co, Pannar
Seed and Pioneer. Local seed companies include:
Agritec, Demeta, Funuwe Farms and the
Association of Smallholder Seed Multiplication
Group (ASSMAG). Monsanto is the most
dominant multinational seed company
controlling more than 50 per cent of the market
share of improved maize varieties. Almost all of
the large companies focus almost exclusively on
the production of hybrid maize seeds; although
some, notably Pannar, also deal in open-
pollinated varieties (OPVs).
The total maize seed market is estimated at about
30,000 metric tonnes annually, of which improved
seed is 32 per cent or 9,000 metric tonnes, for
which effective demand is estimated at 4,500
metric tonnes. Smallholder farmers’ adoption of
improved maize has been rather sluggish.
According to the 2009/10 estimates, around 30 per
cent of farmers cultivate local maize varieties
(GRAIN 2010). As a result, the sale of improved
seed is greatly influenced by government policies,
notably input support programmes.
The major local player in the seed industry is
ASSMAG. It started off as a Ministry of
Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS)
initiative in 1995, whose goal was ‘to ensure the
availability of adaptable, affordable, improved
seed for the smallholder farmers who could not
afford hybrid seeds’. It was transformed into an
association in 1999 with funding from the
European Union (EU). It deals with various
crops such as OPVs, maize, groundnuts, beans,
cassava, sweet potatoes, sorghum, soya beans,
rice, millet, etc. The main seed product for
ASSMAG is OPV maize, since ‘funding for the
multiplication of other crops is often not readily
available’. ASSMAG works closely with the
national breeding programme, which is the sole
source of the foundation seeds used in its
multiplication programmes.
The players in the seed industry have constituted
themselves into the Seed Traders Association of
Malawi (STAM), which is ‘essentially a self
regulatory body for the seed industry to ensure
that farmers are served with quality seed
throughout the country’. The formation of STAM
followed ‘excessive decline in seed quality and
standards due to unscrupulous traders who were
simply offering “decorated grain” on the market
as seed’. The seed industry interacts with
government on matters of seed in relation to the
input support programmes through STAM. It is
only STAM-accredited seed suppliers that are
involved in the input support programmes in
order to ensure that farmers are supplied with
certified and quality seed.
As part of the liberalisation framework, seed
companies distribute their products through an
agro-dealer network. The development of the
agro-dealer network is being facilitated by a
USAID-sponsored NGO – Citizen Network for
Foreign Affairs (CNFA) – as an integral part of
the efforts to kick-start a robust retail network
for agricultural inputs throughout the country to
fill the vacuum created by closure of some
Agricultural Development and Marketing
Corporation (ADMARC) markets (Adesina
2009). CNFA advocates for the replacement of
state-run structures’ direct role in inputs
purchase and distribution by fostering the
growth of a commercially based rural
distribution network of private agro-dealers,
facilitating agro-dealers’ access to commercial
credit, and stimulating smallholders’ demand for
improved agricultural inputs.
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The promotion of the private sector is seen by
many as essential for the development of a
robust agricultural sector. The state-run input
supply system is condemned as inefficient and
highly susceptible to massive rent seeking (Bates
1981; van de Walle 2001). Through the use of
vouchers, a viable agro-dealer network is
described as ‘a way of improving agricultural
input and output markets while providing
support to resource poor farmers’ (Mangisoni
2007: 1). In order to qualify as an agro-dealer,
‘one must not only have a financial muscle but
must also be well enlightened’. CNFA advertises
for applications from suitable individuals or
companies, indicating that potential applicants
must own a building, have access to potable
water, functioning toilet, protective clothing, and
the premises must be far away from fast food
outlets or paraffin selling points.
While seed companies have the liberty to breed
their products elsewhere, the multiplication of the
seed for sale must be done in the country. Seed
companies contract out the seed multiplication
exercise to eligible farmers across the country.
Interested farmers apply to seed companies for
seed multiplication contracts but ‘the isolation
requirement rules out small farmers’. However, it
was argued, ‘seed multiplication is not a business
for poor people; it is for elites since it requires the
farmer to have adequate money which,
realistically speaking, can only be managed by
farmers with land in excess of 10 hectares’.
Seed companies register their farmers with
MoAFS’s Seed Services Unit, which inspects the
maize fields during the growing season to ensure
that standards for certification are met. The
companies provide seed to the farmers and bear
the costs of inspection as well. In addition to
land, the farmer meets the costs of labour and
fertiliser. The seed is sent to the companies’
laboratories immediately after harvesting for
authentication and checking of moisture content.
The seed industry in Malawi is thus clearly
dominated by the multinational companies, with
the locally based companies playing a very minor
role. The multinational companies have inserted
themselves as a dominant actor in the seed
industry following the liberalisation of the
industry at the insistence of donors. The agro-
dealer network is strategically linked to the
multinational seed companies as major outlets of
seed supply to the farmers across the country.
Both government and donors turn to the
multinational seed companies whenever they run
programmes meant to assist impoverished
farmers. These developments have therefore led
to the seed industry being captured by a narrow
group of the private sector players propped up by
both government and donors.
These private sector actors are also offering a
narrow range of technologies to farmers, since
the liberalisation of the seed industry has
resulted in more or less total neglect of public
sector breeding efforts. It was, for instance,
observed that ‘the national breeding programme
exists but it is not as robust as it was during the
late 1980s and early 1990s’. The disappearance
of the National Seed Company of Malawi
(NSCM) has ‘turned Malawi into a sales point
for seed materials bred outside the country’;
‘there is little, if not a lack of uptake of materials
from the national breeding programme since the
national breeding programme is under-funded to
produce materials that can compete with those
from multinationals’. The major argument by
seed companies is that they ‘are interested in
quality as an integral part of their competition
strategy which forces them to look beyond the
borders’. In order to retain a competitive edge,
seed companies ‘promote their own materials
because the quality from the national breeding
programme would be essentially the same’.
While the multinational companies are not
obliged to utilise materials from the national
breeding programme, the stature of the
programme has been further undermined by gross
under-funding. It was consistently observed that
‘breeders are funded on salary and not operational
costs’, resulting in frustration ‘that has seen a
critical cadre of breeders that was assembled
during the hybrid maize revolution leaving for
greener pastures’. Most junior scientists are using
MoAFS as a stepping stone for rewarding careers
elsewhere, such that ‘the remaining senior
scientists do not have understudies so as to ensure
institutional continuity’. The funding constraints
have therefore effectively undermined the
continuity of the successful research on hybrids
that spurred the short-lived Green Revolution of
the 1980s and 1990s. The funding is so low to the
extent that ‘it is often difficult to constantly inject
foundation seed for multiplication to meet the
demand of farmers’.
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While liberalisation and structural adjustment
policies have had a significant impact on the
national breeding programme, ‘government’s
priorities in the agricultural sector too are to
blame’, it was claimed. Input support
programmes receive the lion’s share of the
budget, with the MoAFS spending almost all its
time on AISP at the expense of the normal
agricultural development programmes,
particularly research and extension. With the
multinational companies’ dominance of the
market, they have been able to insert themselves
into the input subsidy programmes, as the
preferred source for many of the programmes.
Some argue that such international seed
companies neither develop seeds locally nor do
they import their best materials. This leaves
farmers with seeds that do not contain the latest
improvements to deal with drought, pests or
nutritional quality of the grain. It is only new
varieties of maize that enter farming systems with
regularity, except when there are special
development programmes for what are variously
described as ‘orphan crops’, ‘forgotten crops’, ‘non-
commercial crops’ or ‘women’s crops’ (CIAT et al.
2009). The crumbling of the public sector breeding
programmes has meant that the country has
become almost entirely dependent on the
multinational seed companies for the bulk of
improved seed supply although not necessarily of
the ideal quality for the local agronomic
conditions. This has been reinforced by the shrewd
business strategies of multinational companies
that have succeeded in marginalising the national
breeding programme, further reinforced by the
coincidence of interests of donors and government
in finding quick fixes to the enduring problem of
food insecurity even though for different reasons.
Local companies are at fault too. The regular
failures by the local seed companies to meet
their contractual obligations are affecting their
ability to establish themselves as serious
competitors in the seed industry. For instance,
there is a huge market potential for ASSMAG
‘since we deal with OPVs which are being
promoted by NGOs but with regular slip ups in
seed processing we are letting down our clients’.
The seed industry in Malawi has been greatly
shaped by donor perceptions of how to develop a
viable seed system, powered by the private sector
under the aegis of economic liberalisation. The
seed companies have exploited the attendant
policy environment to their advantage, propped
up by donors and government in a way that has
marginalised the national breeding programme
and local seed companies. This has, in turn,
reduced the diversity of the crop portfolio readily
available to farmers through the formal seed
system and input subsidy programmes.
3 The politics of input subsidies: the case of the
AISP
Over the period from 1998, three major input
subsidy programmes have been rolled out in
Malawi, culminating in the major Agricultural
Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) from 2005. In
many respects, these have been highly successful,
ushering in a much-acclaimed ‘Green
Revolution’. But what have been the
political–economic processes involved? Who has
gained, and who has lost? And what lessons can
be learned about policy and implementation from
an unpacking of the politics of input subsidies in
this period? This section focuses on the largest
and most recent programme, the AISP.
The AISP was introduced during the 2005/06
growing season, following a devastating hunger
crisis during the 2004/05 season. Using a voucher
system, 1.5 million maize and 200,000 tobacco
farmers were targeted. Maize farmers were
entitled to one 50kg bag of basal and top
dressing fertilisers. Both fertilisers were sold at
MK950. Tobacco farmers were entitled to one
50kg bag of CAN and D compound each at
MK1,450 per bag. Maize farmers had access to
3kg OPV maize at MK150/3kg compared to the
market price of MK500/3kg. AISP has evolved
since its introduction during the 2005/06 growing
season. In the maiden implementation of the
AISP, the government received no support from
donors because they felt the programme would
jeopardise prospects for macroeconomic recovery
and ‘all distribution of subsidised inputs was
done by [two] parastatal bodies, Agricultural
Development and Marketing Corporation
(ADMARC) and Smallholder Farmer Fertilizer
Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFRM)’
(Dorward and Chirwa 2009: 3).
The AISP is widely billed as a tremendous
success. Since its introduction, Malawi has
consistently produced surplus maize over and
above its annual requirement estimated at
2.1 million metric tonnes. In all growing seasons
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Malawi has produced over 500,000 metric tonnes
of surplus maize but the 2007/08 season broke
the record. Total maize production was
estimated at 3,444,655 metric tonnes. This
represented a surplus of about 1.5 million metric
tonnes over and above the annual food
requirement. But, despite the overall success,
there remain intense debates about key elements
of the programme. Three are highlighted below.
3.1 Technology choices
First, there are competing views on what is the
most appropriate seed. Multinational seed
companies have clearly seized on the apparent
success of AISP to justify the use of hybrid seed.
It was, for instance, argued that ‘the AISP has
been successful because of giving farmers a
choice between hybrid and OPV maize’. In this
regard, it was observed that ‘AISP broke the
record during the 2007/08 growing season when
hybrid maize was introduced as an option for
farmers; the 2005/06 season used exclusively
OPV maize’. For the seed companies, the
widespread popularity of hybrid maize challenges
the perception of some donors and NGOs that
hybrid maize (and especially GM varieties) is
inappropriate for small-scale farmers.
The positions of NGOs on the hybrid-GM-OPV-
local maize seed are quite diverse. The main
justification for NGOs promoting local maize
seed varieties is that the local maize seed system
is sustainable. This hinges on the fact that local
seeds can be recycled continuously; are pest and
disease resistant; familiar to farmers; easy to
store; amenable to traditional methods of
processing; taste better; and can withstand
prolonged periods of dry spell. Some of the
NGOs argue that promoting the hybrid maize
seed system would be tantamount ‘to divesting
local farmers of their right since they have been
custodians of seed from time immemorial; it will
be unfair to take this responsibility away from
them and give it to foreigners who are only
interested in making profit out of local people’.
Government’s official policy is to promote the
use of improved maize varieties. This means that
government is committed to promoting both
hybrids and OPVs. However, it was argued that
‘there has been a silent switch from OPVs to
hybrids as the subsidy programme has evolved’.
The apparent preference for hybrids is linked to
the primacy of maize in the country’s political
economy (cf. Sahely et al. 2005; Harrigan 2005;
Chinsinga 2007). Food security, equated to more
or less the availability of maize to the masses at
affordable prices, remains the key electoral
battleground. The legitimacy of any government
is almost entirely dependent on its ability to
fulfil this extremely vital element of the social
contract. Politicians are therefore interested in
hybrids because ‘they want to have something to
show to the people during the electoral
campaign; high yield attainable through the use
of hybrids is the drive for the government,
government here as in politicians’.
3.2 Modes of delivery
Second, the modalities of delivering inputs to
farmers are also a subject of ongoing debate. As
stated above, when the government implemented
AISP without any donor support, both fertilisers
and maize seed were distributed to farmers by
two state parastatals: ADMARC and SFFRFM
(Chinsinga 2007; Dorward and Chirwa 2009).
Since then, the private sector has been
consistently involved. Donors in particular
‘wanted greater involvement of the private sector
in both the procurement and the distribution of
subsidised fertiliser and other farm inputs on
equal terms with ADMARC and SFFRFM’
(Chinsinga 2007: 26). Donors were concerned
that the exclusion of the private sector in the
subsidy programme would slow down, if not
reverse, gains from economic liberalisation. As a
result of the large government programme, about
60–70 per cent of the retail outlets closed because
of reduced retail sales during the 2005/06
growing season (Dorward, Chirwa and Jayne
2007). The share of private sector fertiliser sales
tumbled from 87 per cent in the 2004/05 growing
season to 41 per cent during the 2005/06 season.
The main thrust of the donors’ argument was
that involvement of the private sector would
facilitate the diversification of the AISP beyond
tobacco and maize which, in turn, would
stimulate progressive and sustainable private
sector growth and development. The use of
vouchers would ensure that ‘non-commercial
seed and fertiliser distribution are channelled to
the development of the commercial seed and
fertiliser marketing distribution sectors’
(Mangisoni 2007: 1). Unlike direct input
distribution, vouchers allow the private sector to
expand their retail distribution networks
countrywide into rural areas. The use of vouchers
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qualifies AISP as a ‘smart subsidy’ and therefore
acceptable to donors. The distorting effects of
vouchers are claimed to be limited because they
promote market competition among sellers,
which greatly motivates them to improve their
services. The use of vouchers also, it is argued,
serves as an incentive for seed and fertiliser
dealers to establish outlets in remote areas but
perhaps more critically ‘help government achieve
social objectives through commercial means’.
The AISP voucher system ‘is moving improved
seed to more than 1.7 million farming families in
a manner that is more efficient than the
government system’.
However, the benefits of the subsidy programme
are offset by huge transaction costs incurred
through voucher redemption. The process is
regarded as extremely tedious ‘as we have to
serialize all vouchers before we can get paid; we
have no choice but to employ additional staff to
undertake this exercise’. There is, however,
evidence to show that seed sales have
dramatically improved because of the subsidy
programme. For the seed companies and agro-
dealers, this is a cash cow, since effective demand
for improved seed is as low as 4,500 metric
tonnes out of the possible 30,000 metric tonnes
produced. According to GRAIN (2010), the
subsidy programme has expanded the demand
for improved seed by 5,500 metric tonnes. The
local seed companies have not fully exploited the
commercial benefits arising out of the subsidy
programme, however, because of their reliance
on the multinational seed companies to process
their seeds, while, among the multinational seed
companies, Monsanto is the major beneficiary,
since it controls more than 50 per cent of the
hybrid maize market in the country.
Farmers emphasise the advantage of agro-
dealers, arguing that ‘they are near our villages
and they are a good alternative when we fail to
buy from ADMARC at least when they are
involved in the distribution of fertiliser’.1 They
argue, however, that, for the benefits of the
private sector’s involvement to be fully realised,
the regulatory framework has to be tightened.
This was deemed essential because traders are
primarily motivated to make a profit to the
extent that without any sound and enforceable
regulatory framework, farmers would end up as
victims. There is thus a need to keep the
exploitative tendencies of unscrupulous traders
in constant check by having in place a favourable
but enforceable regulatory framework.
3.3 Regulatory capacity
Third, the form of regulation appropriate to a
liberalised seed industry is another bone of
contention. The liberalisation of the seed
industry has substantially undermined the
capacity of the state to regulate the seed industry
effectively. Several actors have taken advantage of
the weaknesses. While the policy and regulatory
framework for the seed industry is lauded as
sound and progressive, ‘it is undermined by laxity
in enforcement’, as there is questionable capacity
of MoAFS agencies to enforce quality standards.
The laxity in enforcement of standards is
triggered both by political opportunism and
limited capacity. Booth et al. (2006) argue that
the failure to manage the transition to
democracy was, inter alia, manifested in declining
capacity of the civil service to function
professionally. Commentators argue that ‘politics
totally undermined the seed inspection regime,
since there was virtually no political will to
enforce the regulatory framework’. Most of the
politically connected seed suppliers to the
programme ‘simply provided grain from the
village which affected the quality and impact of
the programme’. Most commercial seed
suppliers, it was claimed, ‘were simply putting on
the market painted grains as seed’.
The capacity for seed inspection remains limited,
despite efforts to ratchet it up through training
in seed technology. It is a huge challenge for the
seed certifying agency to carry out the exercise
for seed grown in dispersed locations due to
‘paucity of staff even though such expertise is
available locally’. This is further undermined by
rampant corruption in seed inspection exercises.
The root cause is that seed inspectors are not
adequately resourced in a decentralised set-up
which ‘predisposes them to fraud, malpractices
and corruption, resulting in excessive laxity in
the enforcement of the regulations’. The weak
seed inspection regime has made it possible for
‘seed companies to recycle their products, which
is greatly affecting germination rates’.
The post-liberalisation context has also raised the
profile of breeders’ rights in the seed industry.
Both donors and seed companies argue that the
seed industry is less vibrant due to the absence of
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a breeders’ rights legislative framework. This has
been used as a justification by the multinational
seed companies for not working with the national
breeding programme as a potential source of their
genetic materials. In the absence of breeders’
rights legislation, ‘the products of the national
breeding programme would not be competitive in
an industry where competition through product
differentiation is the order of the day’, they argue.
4 The politics of Malawi’s new Green Revolution
alliance
While debates remain about technology, delivery
and regulation, the AISP has generated a
formidable coalition of players, each committed
(for different reasons) to a particular form of
‘Green Revolution’ for Malawi, based on private
sector delivery of improved seeds supported by
‘smart subsidies’. What, then, is the politics of
this alliance?
From the 1990s, an ensemble of liberalisation
policies created a weak policy environment that
multinational seed companies, as well as political
elites, have exploited to their advantage. For
most donors, a private sector-led seed system,
supported by a permissive, liberalised policy
environment, is the surest strategy to kick-
starting an African Green Revolution.
Consequently, major donors are promoting the
establishment of an extensive agro-dealer
network as a viable alternative to the state-run
system of input supply to farmers which is
condemned as inefficient and highly susceptible
to rent-seeking activities (van de Walle 2001;
Crawford et al. 2003).
In this alliance, large seed companies are
propped up by donors and government through
various input support programmes.
Multinational seed companies are targeted as
the primary suppliers, as their seed products are
deemed superior to those offered by local
companies. Both donors and government are
understandably keen to find quick fixes to the
problem of hunger, and have sought out the
newest high-yielding technologies. But there are
downsides too. Well-funded input support
programmes create multiple opportunities for
patronage for government officials and their
supporters, as well as private companies.
The liberalisation of the seed industry has given
rise to a new layer of elites profiting from the
liberalised seed industry, in turn backed by input
support programmes. Core to these middle-level
elites are the agro-dealers and contract seed
growers for the multinational seed companies. No
ordinary person can qualify either as an agro-
dealer or contract seed grower, since both ventures
require large capital outlays. Most of these
emerging elites are politically connected, since
government officials have exploited the input
support programmes as a source of patronage.
However, there is competition within the new
elite Green Revolution alliance. Seed companies
are deemed exploitative by most agro-dealers,
because they prefer providing seed to agro-
dealers on loan and are paid on a commission
basis, ‘which most of the time just goes to settle
the loans on which seed companies charge
interest’. Many agro-dealers considered the
practice of seed companies charging interest on
loans as illegal. The main concern is that the seed
companies are overstepping their mandate,
‘behaving as if they are lending institutions which
warrant scrutiny of their licenses’. While seed
multiplication is generally acknowledged as a
lucrative business, there were nonetheless
sentiments that the exercise is exploitative. It
was, for instance, argued that ‘[seed
multiplication] just works out exactly in the same
way as a tenancy system in tobacco farming which
is very exploitative’. The main concern centres on
the huge price differentials between what seed
companies offer to the seed growers and what
they get when they put the seed on the market.
An example was given of a seed company which
offered growers in the 2008/09 growing season
MK90/kg, but sold the seed at MK375/kg.
Multinational seed companies are therefore the
major beneficiaries of the subsidy programme
because they have a guaranteed market. Since
the uptake of improved seed is constrained by
lack of money among smallholder farmers, ‘the
subsidy ensures that farmers that would have
otherwise used uncertified seed are able to
access improved seed’. Seed companies have a
guaranteed market because seed procurement
for AISP is not done through a competitive
tendering process. Since government buys a
substantial amount of seed, they negotiate for a
lower than market price. For the 2009/10
growing season, for instance, the market value
for the voucher was MK1,900 but government
offered seed companies MK1,500 per 5kg pack.
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Local seed companies are not able to take
advantage of the market guaranteed by the
subsidy programme because they rely almost
entirely on the multinational seed companies to
process their seed.
Since the question of food security is so firmly at
the centre of the country’s electoral politics,
there is popular consensus about the centrality of
subsidies in combating the problem of pervasive,
chronic hunger. This is difficult for political
leaders to ignore in a democratic context,
especially since the subsidy programme has
become the single most important vote winning
issue. The differences among political parties are
merely in terms of the nature, magnitude and
target of the subsidies. Although there have been
concerns about the increasing cost of the subsidy
programme, exacerbated by the sharp rise in the
prices of fertiliser, the question of exit is hardly
contemplated (Chirwa and Dorward 2010). In
short, Malawi is for the time being locked into
subsidy policies without any immediate prospect
of exit.
There have been winners and losers from the
implementation of the AISP at two levels.
Beneficiary farmers have gained in terms of
improved yields due to access to fertiliser and
improved seed which they can hardly afford at
the market rate. There is a huge price
differential between subsidised and unsubsidised
fertiliser. Beneficiaries of AISP pay MK500 for a
50kg bag of fertiliser when the same bag can be
bought at MK5,000 on the market. The other
major groups of beneficiaries are those that have
emerged as agro-dealers and contract seed
growers. They are mostly male and fairly rich
members of the farming community. The
majority of the farmers are, however, losers
because the AISP has either been captured by
local elites or exploited as a source of political
patronage, excluding many.
Choosing beneficiaries for the subsidy
programme puts enormous pressure on the
village heads because everybody wants to benefit.
This is regardless of the fact that village heads
‘are no longer at the centre of the beneficiary
identification process, but then they have a moral
obligation to ensure fairness and equity in the
administration of any form of external support’.
This has been a source of tension between
villagers and their leaders. Regardless of the
procedures of identifying beneficiaries ‘village
heads in most villages have a final say in terms of
who benefits and who does not’. In many cases,
this has forced village heads ‘to resort to
redistributing the inputs to all households once
the chosen beneficiaries have taken delivery of
the inputs from the distribution centres’. This
means that the beneficiaries on the official list
are simply used as conduits for the inputs to the
villages where they are then subjected to ‘a
morally justifiable redistribution exercise’.2
Many farmers therefore consider themselves as
great losers from the AISP. They argue that ‘the
programme is justified in our name but we are
the biggest losers’.3 For instance, AISP provides
beneficiaries with three coupons for fertiliser,
maize seed and a flexible coupon ‘but seeds like
groundnuts, millet, sorghum, peas, etc. are never
made available’.4 The general feeling is that
farmers feel cheated, since ‘the programme is
justified as ours when it is, in fact, for chiefs,
politicians, extension workers, vendors and
ADMARC officials’.5 Extension workers are
considered as beneficiaries because there is a
strong feeling that they connive with chiefs to
defraud the AISP: ‘Their trick is to work with
village heads to convince us all that some
beneficiaries were cut off from the list by
computers and then share these inputs with
chiefs’. ADMARC officials work with vendors ‘to
make a killing out of AISP’.6 The argument is
that vendors are able to get coupons and ‘when
inputs are available at ADMARC depots vendors
are prioritised at the expense of us deserving
beneficiaries’.7 The vendors then resell the
subsidy fertiliser. The villagers are sometimes
forced to buy this fertiliser ‘especially when there
are prolonged breaks in the supply chain to
ADMARC depots’. Politicians are also
beneficiaries of AISP because they often use it as
political bait during electoral campaigns. It was
argued that ‘politicians get our votes by cheating
us that they will ensure that we all get coupons
but they change tune when the time comes’.8 The
farmers’ argument is that ‘politicians are thus
often convincing, but they hardly live up to their
promises; what matters to them is that they get
elected’. The farmers’ analysis clearly
demonstrates that different stakeholders have
different interests that play out in the
implementation of AISP. Farmers benefit but the
magnitude of their benefit is undercut by the
rent-seeking tendencies of various stakeholders.
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5 Conclusions
Politics matter in the initiation, uptake and
implementation of all policy interventions, and
particularly those as significant politically as
Malawi’s subsidy programmes. Good technical
recommendations do not make their way into
policy or implementation, unless there is real
support from the politically powerful. As long as
smallholder farmers remain disorganised, they
are unable to exert influence. Subsidy
programmes geared to a ‘Green Revolution’ were
readily embraced by government because of a
strong political drive to find solutions to the
rapidly deteriorating food security situation and
declining soil fertility. The implementation of the
AISP, and the subsequent dominance of hybrid
maize, is a result of political manoeuvring, and a
coalition of interests, involving the government
(with an eye to political success), multinational
seed companies (keen on market dominance) and
political elites (able to cash in on the business
generated, or patronage spread).
This study has revealed how gaining access to
high-quality and improved seed at affordable
prices is a problem for many smallholder farmers,
especially in a weak policy environment. It has
also shown how multinationals have come to
dominate the domestic commercial seed sector,
propped up by the convergence of donor and
government interests with those of seed
companies, albeit for different goals. Malawi’s
experience illustrates that foreign direct
investments, through ownership of production and
sales outlets in the seed industry, can have
impacts on poor and smallholder farmers in ways
that they are powerless to deal with. This becomes
heavily entrenched if the local elites capture part
of the benefits, especially when these serve the
political interests of the governing elite as has
happened in Malawi. The input programmes,
supported by donors in their quest to kick-start
private sector development through multinational
seed companies, have been exploited as a source
of political patronage at different levels. The
business strategies of seed companies affect the
terms of access to seeds, the affordability of seeds,
the diversity of genetic resources on farmer fields,
the income and livelihood of resource-poor
farmers, the relationships with agricultural
research organisations and ultimately the overall
food security.
Concerted efforts are required to reform the
country’s seed industry for it to serve the interests
of the ordinary Malawian farmer better. The
major challenge is the weak policy environment
following liberalisation, which various actors have,
in different ways, exploited to advance their own
selfish interests. There is thus urgent need to
improve the efficiency and implementation of
regulatory frameworks, revitalise the national
breeding system and support the capacity and
competitiveness of the local seed industry if
Malawi’s Green Revolution is genuinely to benefit
smallholder farmers in the long term.
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Notes
1 Youth focus group discussion (FGD) at
Mkungumbe village.
2 Women FGD at Mkungumbe village.
3 Women FGD at Mkungumbe village.
4 Female FGD at Kadammanja village.
5 Mixed FGD at Kadammanja village.
6 Youth FGD at Kadammanja village.
7 Mixed FGD at Mkungumbe village.
8 Men FGD at Kadammanja village.
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